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Since 1950, housing prices have risen regularly by almost two percent per year.  Between 
1950 and 1970, this increase reflects rising housing quality and construction costs.  Since 
1970, this increase reflects the increasing difficulty of obtaining regulatory approval for 
building new homes.  In this paper, we present a simple model of regulatory approval that 
suggests a number of explanations for this change including changing judicial tastes, 
decreasing ability to bribe regulators, rising incomes and greater tastes for amenities, and 
improvements in the ability of homeowners to organize and influence local decisions.  
Our preliminary evidence suggests that there was a significant increase in the ability of 
local residents to block new projects and a change of cities from urban growth machines 
to homeowners’ cooperatives.   
 
   2
I.  The Rise in Housing Prices 
The mean and variance of housing prices have risen across the United States since 
1950.  The top panel of Table 1 shows that the average price across the 316 metropolitan 
areas of the continental United States has increased 1.7 percent annually from $59,575 in 
1950 (in 2000 dollars) to $138,601 in 2000.  More notable is the widening variance.  
Since 1970, the standard deviation of real prices across metropolitan areas increased by 
247 percent compared with a 72 percent increase in average prices.   
As Figure 1 shows, this rising variance reflects an explosion of housing values at 
the top end of the price distribution.  The top line in the figure plots the real average price 
for the metropolitan area at the 90
th percentile of the house value distribution. The second 
line depicts price in the median metropolitan area, and the third line shows the mean 
house value for the area at the 10
th percentile of the distribution.  In 1970, the average 
house price in the metropolitan area at the 90
th percentile was 35 percent more expensive 
than that of the median metropolitan area.  In 1990, the 90
th percentile area’s price was 
more than twice as expensive as for the median metropolitan area.  There has been little 
change in the gap between the median metropolitan area and low-cost areas. 
Too often, analysts attempt to understand housing prices only by attending to 
demand-side factors such as interest rates or per capita income, while ignoring the 
supply-side of the market.  Rising prices require not only rising demand, but also limits 
on supply.  The supply of housing includes three elements: land, a physical structure, and 
government approval to put the structure on the land.  Thus, rising prices must reflect 
rising physical costs of construction, increasing land prices or regulatory barriers to new 
construction.      3
The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the real value of construction costs per square 
foot for a modest-quality, single-family home in a sample of 177 markets tracked by the 
R.S. Means Company, a data provider to the home building industry.  Average house 
prices and construction costs rose together between 1950 and 1970, but since 1970, the 
cost of putting up the physical structure has declined slightly while housing prices have 
continued to rise.  Even in booming markets, construction cost increases have been 
modest.  Between 1970 and 2000, real construction costs in San Francisco and Boston 
rose by 4.6 percent and 6.6 percent, respectively.  Over the same 30 years, real mean 
house prices rose by 270 percent in the San Francisco primary metropolitan statistical 
area (PMSA) and 127 percent in the Boston metropolitan area. 
Rising structure costs still could explain the post-1970 growth in housing prices if 
structural size and quality were increasing rapidly.  To assess the importance of housing 
quality, we can compare the overall rise in housing prices with the rise in prices measured 
by repeat-sales indices that hold housing structure constant.  In the United States as a 
whole, the real median value of owner-occupied housing rose by 1.20 percent per year 
from 1980 to 2000.  Over this same period, real appreciation of the repeat-sales index 
published by the Office of Federal Enterprise Housing Oversight (OFHEO) was 0.93 
percent per year, which suggests that changes in the quality of housing account for no 
more than one quarter of the average increase in housing values.  The same methodology 
in high-price areas shows that quality growth is even less important in those places.
1 
                                                 
1 For example, real median prices rose by 3.14 percent per year between 1980-2000 in the San Francisco 
metropolitan area according to U.S. Census data, while OFHEO reports a 3.45 percent real appreciation 
rate for its constant quality series of repeat sales.  The analogous numbers for the New York metropolitan 
area are 3.64 percent and 3.71 percent, respectively.  Because changes in structure quality clearly do not 
account for higher prices in the most expensive coastal markets, we use Census data because it is available 
over a much longer time period.    4
A summary measure of the importance of physical structure is the ratio of the 
average house price (P) to the estimated physical construction cost (CC) for 102 
metropolitan areas in each Census year from 1950-2000.
2, 
3  If the housing supply market 
is competitive, then the difference between the value of this P/CC ratio and one tells us 
how much of the value of housing cannot be accounted for by the physical cost of 
supplying the unit.
 4  This remainder reflects either the cost of land or the costs of 
obtaining regulatory approval. The top two rows of Table 2 report the sample means and 
standard deviations of the distribution of P/CC in each of the last six Census years, while 
the bottom two rows report the implied share of land and regulatory approval (i.e., 1 – 
CC/P).  Even in the most expensive metropolitan areas, structure appears to have 
represented almost all of the cost of housing in 1970 and earlier years.
5   As the bottom 
two rows of Table 2 indicate, the physical cost of constructing the house represented 
about 90 percent of the value of the home in the metropolitan area in the 90
th percentile of 
the P/CC distribution in 1970.  In the San Francisco PMSA, which had the lowest share 
                                                 
2 Because construction costs are reported per square foot, housing values are divided by an estimate of the 
median size of single-family homes in each metropolitan area.  Specifically, the American Housing Survey 
(AHS) is used to calculate median unit size for single-family homes in 1999.  We then assume that unit size 
grew by 2.75% per decade between 1960 and 2000, which roughly corresponds to national changes in unit 
sizes in the AHS and information on the size of new single-family homes.  In other work using data dating 
back only to 1980, we make additional adjustments to the numerator and denominator of the P/CC ratio to 
help control for potential bias in self-reporting of house values and for aging of the housing stock (see 
Glaeser and Gyourko (2005)).  Given the longer time span examined here, we are unable to make those 
same adjustments.  Our previous research shows that not controlling for the depreciation on existing homes 
is more important empirically than not controlling for the upward bias in self-reported house values.  
Hence, the P/CC ratios used here are likely to be biased downward.  Experimentation confined to data from 
more recent decades finds that the cross sectional distribution of P/CC ratios across cities is not sensitive to 
these adjustments (or lack thereof).      
3 These 102 areas include the PMSA components of CMSAs.  Grouping the relevant PMSAs together, 
there are 68 distinct MSAs, CMSAs and NECMAs.   
4 Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005) present extensive evidence suggesting the highly competitive nature of 
the housing market.   
5 There are several explanations for why we observe so many metropolitan areas with average housing 
price below construction costs.  As mentioned above, these estimates are not adjusted for the depreciation 
of existing homes.  Another factor that would bias our estimates downward is if housing units were smaller 
in the past than we assume.  In general, we have chosen assumptions to err on the side of yielding a 
conservative (lower) P/CC ratio.     5
of total house value accounted for by physical construction costs, only 24 percent was not 
due to structure value.   
It is only since 1980, and only in a relatively few metropolitan areas, that there 
has been a widening gap between price and construction cost.  Almost all of the markets 
in which housing prices became substantially higher than physical production costs 
during the 1970s were part of the three big coastal metropolises in California—the Los 
Angeles-centered CMSA, the San Francisco-centered CMSA, and the San Diego MSA.   
A decade later, gaps between prices and construction costs on the West Coast had 
grown and had spread to interior markets in California.  For example, structure 
represented only 53 percent of average house value in Sacramento in 1990.  High prices 
relative to construction costs had also spread to other West Coast markets such as Seattle.  
The non-structure component of house value also exceeded 40 percent across a swath of 
the east coast roughly approximated by Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor.      
By the year 2000, there were 27 metropolitan areas in which structure could 
account for no more than 60 percent of total house value.  These locations include 
virtually all of the coastal areas already discussed.  Moreover, the 1990s witnessed the 
spread of high housing prices relative to physical production costs to interior markets 
such as Ann Arbor, MI, Austin-San Marcos, TX, Denver, CO, Nashville, TN, and 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC.  In the highest priced housing markets in the nation 
(the PMSAs within the San Francisco CMSA), structure is estimated to represent no more 
than 30 percent of house value.  Figure 2 plots the P/CC ratios in 2000 versus 1970 for all 
102 metropolitan areas, and starkly illustrates the dramatic rise in the gap between price 
and construction cost in the highest price markets over the past three decades.   6
  The key to understanding the rise in housing prices relative to construction costs 
is that new construction has declined sharply in high price locations.  Figure 3 documents 
the drop in new construction intensity in three increasingly expensive metropolitan areas: 
New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles.  New construction is measured at decadal 
frequencies as the share of housing units built since the last Census divided by the 
number of units in the area in the preceding Census.  The values reported for 1960 
indicate that Los Angeles increased its stock by nearly 60 percent during the 1950s, while 
the number of housing units in San Francisco expanded by more than 30 percent.  Even 
New York increased the size of its housing stock by more than 20 percent that decade.  
By the 1990s, the housing stock in all three metropolitan areas increased by well under 10 
percent over the decade. 
  Although these three large, high housing price areas are outliers, Table 3 shows 
that there has been a significant reduction in the rate of new construction nationally.  In 
the 1950s, the median rate of new construction was 40 percent in our sample of 102 
metropolitan areas.  Four decades later it had fallen to 14 percent, which was still double 
the rates seen in San Francisco, New York, and Los Angeles.  
As late as the 1970s, there was a robust relationship between new construction 
and the ratio of price to construction costs.  Figure 4 shows that in places where prices 
were high relative to construction costs in 1970, there was more new construction over 
the ensuing decade (with the notable exception of the San Francisco PMSA).  Figure 5 
repeats the exercise for the 1990s, documenting that this basic relationship has been 
reversed.  It is no longer the case that high prices relative to construction costs generally 
lead to a surge in new construction.   7
  Table 4 shows the declines in residential construction more rigorously.  For our 
panel of 102 metropolitan areas, we begin by regressing the ratio of new construction to 
the initial housing stock on year dummy variables.  These coefficients, which are 
reported in the first column, document the significant decline in the intensity of new 
construction between 1960 and today.  The second regression includes controls for 
density, income and the ratio of price-to-construction cost at the beginning of the decade.  
The controls for price and density are both statistically significant, but they explain little 
of the change over time.  These three controls together reduce the coefficient on the year 
2000 by .05, or about 14 percent.  While such a regression is only suggestive, the results 
indicate that rising density levels can only explain a small amount of the decline in new 
construction over time.  The third regression adds interactions of the P/CC variable with 
the year dummies.  Just as the figures suggested, there was a powerful relationship 
between price and new construction during the earlier time periods that vanished by the 
1990s (e.g., the total effect of P/CC in 1990, which is the sum of coefficient on the level 
of P/CC and its interaction with 1990, is very close to zero).   
These results strongly suggest that restrictions on new supply have become 
increasingly important in preventing suppliers from responding to high prices by building 
additional units.  But are these limits on new construction the result of a dwindling supply 
of land or other barriers to new construction?  Table 4 already suggested that this change 
cannot be explained by density alone.  Further evidence that rising density is not strong 
enough to explain large declines in construction can be found by examining individual 
permit-issuing places within the San Francisco metropolitan area.  Figure 6 depicts a 
robust negative relationship between initial period density and new construction in the   8
1990s.  However, it also shows many low-density, high cost areas with very little new 
construction.
6   
  A final check on the density hypothesis is to return to the share of housing prices 
that is not related to physical construction costs.  Beyond physical structure, the cost of 
supplying a house includes both the cost of the land and the cost of the right to build.  If 
the costs associated with the right to build were small, then the non-structure value of the 
property would include only the cost of the land.  A completely free market for land 
would lead land to be worth the same amount on both the intensive and extensive 
margins.  Stated differently, a quarter acre would be valued the same if it sits under one 
house or if it extends the lot of another house.  Using this insight, Glaeser and Gyourko 
(2003) and Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005) use hedonic price estimation to estimate 
the price of land when it extends the lot of an existing house.  We find that such land is 
not all that valuable; generally a quarter acre is worth about ten times more if it sits under 
a house than if it extends the lot of another house.  The fact that land is worth much more 
when it is bundled together with the right to build provides further evidence that the right 
to build is worth a great deal.
7  
In sum, the evidence points toward a man-made scarcity of housing in the sense 
that the housing supply has been constrained by government regulation as opposed to 
                                                 
6 A very similar relationship holds if one looks at the same relationship at the census tract level.  That is, 
more dense tracts have lower permitting intensity, but there are plenty of less dense tracts in the San 
Francisco area with equally low permitting activity.  That graph is available upon request.  More generally, 
Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) show that there is little relationship between density and high housing costs 
across U.S. metropolitan areas. 
7 Additional evidence on the role of zoning is given by the relationship across metropolitan areas between 
zoning and reduced construction levels and higher price increases.  Saks (2004) uses an index of subjective 
assessments of zoning regulations and finds a positive relationship with housing prices and a negative 
relationship with residential construction.   9
fundamental geographic limitations.
8  The growing dispersion of housing prices relative 
to construction costs suggests that these regulations have spread into a larger number of 
local markets over time.  Moreover, they appear to have become particularly severe in the 
past 2-3 decades.  To explore the source of these changes, the next section develops a 
model of the incentives faced by local governments to impose restrictions on residential 
development.               
 
II.  The Economics of Zoning and Permitting 
Our model is one of a local zoning authority that decides whether to approve or 
reject  residential development.  There are two locations: the zoning authority’s town and 
a reservation locale.  There are N total consumers, of which D live in the town.  The 
remainder of the population lives in the reservation locale, and there are no constraints 
preventing people from moving there.  Total utility in this outlying area is a decreasing 
function of the number of people living there,  ) ( D N U − .   
  In the town, the flow of utility equals U(D)+a-housing costs, where U(D) is 
decreasing in the amount of development in the city, and a is an individual-specific desire 
to live in the locale.  The distribution of a is described by a cumulative density F(a) and 
density f(a).  The cost of construction in the town equals K, which can be thought of as 
capturing both physical costs of construction and the opportunity cost of land taken away 
from agricultural uses.  We normalize the cost of construction in the reservation locale to 
be equal to zero, so that K reflects the additional cost of building a housing unit in town.  
Denoting the interest rate as r, the annual cost of housing construction is rK.   
                                                 
8 Even in areas like Manhattan where water restricts the ability to build outward, the option to build upward 
remains.  The choice to limit building heights constrains the number of new housing units just as other 
zoning regulations may limit the number of single-family houses.   10
  As in any spatial equilibrium, there will be a marginal consumer with a taste for 
the town equal to a ˆ  who is indifferent between living in the town or the reservation 
locale.  Every consumer with a value of a greater than a ˆ  will live in the town and the 
remaining consumers will live in the reservation locale.  The marginal consumer must 
satisfy  )) ˆ ( 1 ( a F N D − = ; we use the notation  ( ) N D F D a / 1 ) ( ˆ
1 − =
− . 
The initial population of the town is split into homeowners and renters.  We 
assume that a fraction h of these units are allocated to homeowners and the remainder to 
renters.  All individuals are assumed to live in the community for exactly L time periods.  
After that time, individuals are replaced by identical consumers so that the total size of 
the population remains unchanged.  Individuals maximize  V
rV V
t
rt Asset e dt t u e • +
−
=
− ∫ 0 ) (  
where u(t) is the flow of utility at time t, r is the interest rate and  V Asset  is the value of 
any asset as of time V.  Renters pay the market clearing rent, which is equal to the same 
annual cost as the interest payments on a house.  Both rents and housing values will 
decline with new development.  If the town starts with D housing units, then houses in 
town will be worth 
r
D a D N U D U ) ( ˆ ) ( ) ( + − −
 . 
Given these assumptions, there is a unique amount of development that will 
maximize the average discounted lifetime utility of all current residents of the town.  In 
order to achieve this social optimum, it is necessary to allow for the possibility of side-
payments between developers (who gain from additional residential construction) and 
homeowners (who lose from additional development through lower future housing 
values).  It is straightforward to show that a higher fraction of homeowners will lead to 
less development.  Moreover, because a shorter lifespan makes the resale value of homes   11
more salient to homeowners, shorter life spans also curtail the optimal amount of 
development. 
There are two reasons why the level of development that maximizes the welfare 
of current residents will not be socially optimal.  First, higher population density has a 
negative impact on the utility of future residents of the town and of the reservation locale 
that current residents will not internalize.  Second, current homeowners have an incentive 
to increase the value of their homes, and do not internalize the impact that higher housing 
prices have on non-homeowners who would like to live in the town.   
We now consider the decision faced by the town’s zoning authority who decides 
whether a new development project of size ∆ will proceed.  We simplify the analysis by 
assuming that utility in the reservation locale is fixed at U . Furthermore, we will ignore 
the incentive of renters to lobby for more housing to be built.  Essentially, this 
assumption implies that renters are not organized enough to support the construction of 
new housing.     
The zoning authority will receive net benefits of 
ε α + − + − + ) ( ) ( D R T D R C T T g C C g  from rejecting the project.  The parameter α  
captures the innate distaste of the authority for development.  D C  and  R C  reflect the cash 
spent by developers and town residents to influence the authority’s decision, and  C g  is a 
concave function reflecting the influence that cash will have on the decision-making of 
the authority.  Similarly,  D T  and  R T  reflect the time spent by the developer and residents, 
respectively, on influencing the authority, with a concave function T g  representing the 
influence of time on the authority.  We assume that both g(.) functions are symmetric 
around zero.  Finally, ε  is a uniformly distributed mean-zero idiosyncratic term with   12
density 1.  We will assume that parameter values are such that there is always some 
positive probability that the project will be both accepted and rejected.   
  Under these assumptions, the probability that the authority will authorize the 
project equals  α − − + − + ) ( ) ( 5 . R D T R D C T T g C C g .  We denote the cost of time to the 
developer as  D W  and the cost to residents as  R W .  The developer therefore chooses the 
amount of time and cash spent to influence the zoning board to maximize:   
() D D D R D T R D C C T W K
r
D a U D U






∆ + + − ∆ +
∆ − − + − +
) ( ˆ ) (
) ( ) ( 5 . α . 
  From the perspective of each current homeowner, the development project will 
create a net loss equal to  ( )
r
D a D a e D U D U
rL ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) ( ) ( − ∆ + + − ∆ +
−
.  This expression 
reflects both the negative externality associated with increased population density in town 
and the decline in housing values.  Individuals face costs of influencing the authority 
equal to  R R R C T W + .  Because a continuous distribution of residents implies that each 
individual person has a negligible impact on the zoning decision, we assume the 
existence of a community organization that organizes town residents.  This organization 
includes a proportion λ  of homeowners and maximizes the aggregate utility of its 
members.  We assume that  R D W W >  so that the opportunity cost of time is higher to the 
developer than to the homeowners.  Although this assumption seems plausible, it implies 
that landlords cannot employ renters to lobby the zoning board at the same time cost 
faced by homeowners.
9   
                                                 
9 Historically, it has been rare to see renters fight zoning restrictions.  Perhaps this is due to some agency 
problem that prevents developers from following this strategy.  Stronger homeowner participation might be 
because homeowners simply enjoy the social activity of protesting new developments.    13
  Taken together, this model implies the following two propositions (proofs are in 
the appendix): 
Proposition 1:  If both the landlord and the homeowners association undertake some 
lobbying effort, then the landlord will use only cash and the homeowners will use only 
time.    
  Such specialization of effort seems consistent with much anecdotal evidence on 
local battles between developers and community groups (Warner and Molotch (2000)).  
This result implies: 
Proposition 2:  If both actors engage in a positive amount of lobbying then:  
(1) the probability that the project will be approved declines with α , 
(2) the probability that the project will be approved is decreasing with h and λ , 
(3) if ) ( ~ ) ( x g x g C C C • = γ  and  ) ( ~ ) ( x g x g T T T • = γ  then the probability the project 
will be approved declines with  T γ  and rises with  C γ  , and  
(4) if  ∆ − = ∆ + u D U D U ) ( ) ( , then the probability the project will be approved 
falls with u.   
Proposition 2 sets forth a number of comparative statics that can potentially explain the 
change in the zoning environment in the United States.  The first, and perhaps most 
popular explanation to date, is that an increase in zoning reflects changes in the 
preferences of judges and other political decision-makers.  While there is evidence from 
legal and economics scholarship that judges and local government officials have become 
increasingly sympathetic to community and environmental concerns (see the discussion 
below), it is unsatisfying to explain a large-scale shift of this nature simply by appealing 
to changing preferences.   14
  The second comparative static suggests that the explanation lies in the rise of 
homeownership and the success of community organization.  Increases in both the share 
of homeowners and the political organization of homeowners’ groups should lead to less 
development.  In the past 40 years, the fraction of homeownership has risen from about 
59 to 68% (Federal Reserve Board, 1964 and Aizcorbe et. al., 2003).  Moreover, political 
participation of homeowners groups has been rising (Nelson, 2004, Freund, 1974).  Not 
only should this trend restrict residential development, but Altshuler and Luberoff (2002) 
suggest that these groups have been increasingly able to restrict large-scale nonresidential 
development projects as well.   
  The third part of Proposition 2 points to the changes in the relative effectiveness 
of using cash versus time to influence political decision-makers.  C γ  can be interpreted as 
the efficacy of bribes, and it is quite plausible that this parameter has declined over time.  
In contrast, it is likely that the efficacy of spending time to influence decision-makers has 
increased.  Rising education levels and learning from other political battles (e.g., the civil 
rights movement) may have made community members more savvy about using courts 
and the press. 
  The final comparative static concerns the taste for density.  If rising incomes have 
caused people to place a higher value on living in a low density community, then we 
should expect to see less development.  Other factors, such as crime and improvements in 
transportation, may also have increased the desirability of low-density living.   
 
III.  Evaluating the Explanations for a More Restrictive Zoning Environment 
In this section, we review the possible reasons why it has become more difficult 
to build new homes since 1970.     15
Judicial Tastes 
In 1977, Robert Ellickson noted that “suburban governments are becoming ever 
more adventuresome in their efforts to control housing development.” (p. 388).  Ellickson 
does not explain this change, but points to judicial decisions such as Nectow v. City of 
Cambridge which have made it difficult for landowners to stop municipalities from 
restricting new construction on their land.  Fischel (2004) points to the ideology of 
judges:  “Courts, whose judges share the same environmental attitudes as middle class 
homeowners (just as 1920s judges shared the ideology of hearth and home), were more 
sympathetic to claims that the local decision had failed to account for environmental 
impacts than they had been to seemingly selfish claims that neighbors’ home values were 
at risk.” (pp. 332-333)   Other cases such as Mt. Laurel that demanded low income 
housing have simultaneously allowed growth controls: "once a community has satisfied 
its fair share obligation [a fraction of the region’s low-income housing], the Mount Laurel 
Doctrine will not restrict other measures, including large-lot and open area zoning, that 
would maintain its beauty and communal character"(Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 421 
cited in Fischel (2004), p. 331).   
There can be little doubt that court decisions have become friendlier to anti-
development sentiment.  While courts clearly are important, ultimately it is unsatisfying 
to attribute the change in the zoning environment to changing attitudes of judicial 
decision-makers.  These attitudes are not exogenous, but reflect other trends in American 
society.  If changes in the tastes of judges and policy makers reflect societal trends like 
the environmental movement, then these changes should be viewed as an improved 
effectiveness of certain groups in shaping policy.  In the language of the model, this   16
should be viewed as an increase in  R T  or  T γ , not an exogenous change in α .  
Empirically, we cannot reject the hypothesis that judicial tastes changed, but on 
theoretical grounds this explanation is so unsatisfying that we will turn elsewhere. 
The Impact of Residents’ Groups 
While the influence of developers may or may not have declined, many observers 
have noted a sizable increase in the organization and political impact of local residents.  
Altshuler and Luberoff (2002) examine the history of large scale government projects 
(“Mega Projects”) and describe changes that began in the 1960s, when citizens became 
better able to challenge large scale projects that would impact their neighborhood.  One 
early and striking example was Jane Jacobs’ leadership of the Greenwich Village 
movement that stopped Robert Moses’ West Side highway project in New York.  
Through increasingly sophisticated use of the media, local groups learned how turn 
mega-projects into public relations disasters.  
  There is abundant evidence of the impact of homeowners’ and neighborhood 
groups, but there is less understanding of where this impact comes from.  One hypothesis 
is that homeowners have become better organized (an increase in λ ).  Some analysts 
have suggested that the organization skills of environmental groups were learned from 
the organizational successes of the civil rights movement and the anti-war protests.  
Either through imitation of these earlier groups or because of rising education and media 
savvy, local residents appear to have become better at using the media and the courts.  
Thus, the typical residential activist of 2004 seems more skilled than its counterpart from 
1955.    
   17
The Ability to Use Cash to Influence Local Decision-Makers 
A third possible hypothesis is that developers’ ability to use cash to influence 
local decision-makers has fallen over time.  This influence historically has come both 
from legal payments, in the form of campaign donations or legal cash transfers (i.e. a 
developer employing a politician for legal work), or illegal cash payments or bribes.  
Zoning environments may have become more restrictive if developers in the 1960s were 
more easily able to bribe local politicians than they can today.  In other words, the urban 
growth machine described by Molotch (1976) has weakened as it has become harder for 
developers to transfer cash to politicians.   
  There is some evidence suggesting a decline in corruption over time within the 
United States.  Glaeser and Goldin (2004) use newspaper records to show a decline in the 
share of articles alleging corruption between the late 19
th century and the mid-20
th 
century.  However, their coverage does not show a significant change between 1960s and 
the 1990s—the period of the permitting slowdown.  Anecdotes about corruption in 
development abound, and it may be true that such anecdotes were more common in the 
1960s than today.  While this hypothesis remains plausible, there is precious little 
evidence either supporting or refuting it. 
  Even if it were possible to show such a change, it would be desirable to go further 
and try to understand why this change occurred.  One plausible explanation is that 
improvements in the news media have caused more attention to be paid to corrupt deals.  
A second explanation is that the political influence of local party machines has declined.  
These machines facilitated the flow of funds from developers (or anyone else) and 
ensured that legal repercussions from local justice would be modest.  The decline of local   18
machines might also have played a role in reducing the influence that developers were 
able to have on local governments.   
The Value of Amenities 
Another natural explanation for the rise in restrictions on new construction is that 
rising income levels have increased the willingness to pay for high amenity 
neighborhoods, and in particular, for low density neighborhoods (assuming low density is 
a normal good, of course).  This hypothesis corresponds to an increase in the parameter u, 
which the model predicts should lead to a decrease in permitting as the incentive of 
homeowners to spend time to block new construction rises. 
To evaluate the importance of rising incomes in explaining the decline in 
permitting, we regress the share of new housing units in 1960 on the ratio of housing 
prices to construction costs, density, and the logarithm of income in 1950.  The 
coefficient on income is -.14 (with a standard error of .23), indicating that richer 
communities were less likely to build new housing units.   
However, the magnitude of this coefficient is not large enough to explain the 
general decline in permitting over time.  Our data suggest that permitting has declined by 
37 percentage points between 1960 and today.  In those same areas, real median incomes 
have risen by .77 log points.  Using the estimated coefficient on income, together these 
values suggest that rising incomes can explain only about 29 percent of the fall in 
residential construction.  Rising American incomes are important, but they are only a 
small part of the change in the permitting environment. 
  Another way to think about the effect of income is to consider the zoning 
environment of very rich places in 1960.  If the income hypothesis is correct, then   19
permitting in these places should have been as restrictive in 1960 as the entire 
metropolitan areas of Boston or New York in more recent years.  However, places like 
New Rochelle, NY, San Mateo, CA and West Orange, NJ, each allowed at least 10 times 
as much development in the 1950s as metropolitan areas with comparable incomes today.  
Again, this analysis suggests that the complete story goes well beyond the explanation 
that homeowners became richer. 
Changes in the Housing Market 
A final hypothesis is that the impact of new construction on housing prices has 
changed over time.  In the 1950s, housing costs were low, lower incomes made people 
less concerned about environmental amenities, and an absence of construction in previous 
decades may have meant that the quality of new housing was significantly higher than 
older units.  For these reasons, new construction may not have led to major reductions in 
housing prices for existing units and as such, homeowners had much weaker incentives to 
fight new construction.  In 2004, however, homeowners appear to believe that new 
construction will significantly reduce housing prices.  Certainly, the evidence in this 
paper linking rising housing prices to reductions in construction suggests that they are 
right.  As in the case of the previous theories, we have little evidence on the relevance of 
this theory and we look to further research to examine this hypothesis more thoroughly.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Housing is one of the most important elements in household portfolios and 
budgets.  Over the past 30 years, the dispersion in prices across American markets has 
increased substantially.  In much of the country, new housing units still are abundant and   20
housing prices remain low.  In contrast, new construction has plummeted and housing 
prices have soared in a small, but increasing number of places.  These changes do not 
appear to be the result of a declining availability of land, but rather are the result of a 
changing regulatory regime that has made large-scale development increasingly difficult 
in expensive regions of the country. 
Changes in housing supply regulations may be the most important transformation 
that has happened in the American housing market since the development of the 
automobile, but they are both under-studied and under-debated.  The positive research 
agenda going forward should be to understand why these changes have occurred and 
what relationship exists with other major trends in the American society.  The normative 
policy agenda should be to better understand the costs and benefits of limits on new 
construction.  The costs appear to include higher prices and a misallocation of labor, 
while the benefits include internalization of construction-related externalities.  Given the 
implications of this regulatory shift, the economics profession could make a major 
contribution by analyzing the welfare effects of regulation on the rise in housing prices.   21
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
We use the notation that ( ) ( ) ( )
r
D a D a e D U D U
rL
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∆ + + − ∆ +
∆ = Φ K
r
D a U D U
D
) ( ˆ ) (
 for the losses and gains from development for 
the homeowners and the developer respectively.  For the developer, the marginal product 
of spending an additional dollar is  1 ) ( − Φ − ′ D R D C C C g  and the marginal product of 
spending more time equals D D R D T W T T g − Φ − ′ ) ( . The second derivative of the 
developer’s utility with respect to spending is  D R D C C C g Φ − ′ ′ ) (  and the second derivative 
of the developer’s utility with respect to time is  D R D T T T g Φ − ′ ′ ) ( .  For the homeowners, 
the marginal impact of more spending is  1 ) ( − − ′ Φ R D C R C C g D h λ  and the marginal 
impact of more time is  D R D T R W T T g D h − − ′ Φ ) ( λ .  The second derivative with respect to 
spending is  ) ( R D C R C C g D h − ′ ′ Φ −λ  and the second derivative with respect to time is 
) ( R D T R T T g D h − ′ ′ Φ −λ .  Obviously, if the second order conditions hold for the 
homeowners they cannot hold for the developer and vice-versa.  Because the problem is 
inevitably concave for one of the actors and convex for the other, it cannot be an 
optimum in which for both actors use both technologies.   
  We have assumed that each actor uses at least one technology, so it remains to be 
shown which technology will be used by each actor.  For the homeowners to use cash, it 
must be the case that  1 ) ( 0 ) ( − ′ Φ = < − − ′ Φ D C R R R T R C g D h W T g D h λ λ  which would 
imply that  R D C R T W C g T g < ′ − ′ ) ( / ) ( .  For the developers to use time,   24
D D R T D D C W T g C g − Φ − ′ = < − Φ ′ ) ( 0 1 ) ( , but this would imply that  D D C R T W C g T g > ′ − ′ ) ( / ) ( 
which is a contradiction.  On the other hand, if the homeowners use time and the 
developers use cash, this must imply that 
1 ) ( 0 ) ( − ′ Φ > = − − ′ Φ D C R R R T R C g D h W T g D h λ λ  and 
D D R T D D C W T g C g − Φ − ′ > = − Φ ′ ) ( 0 1 ) (.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Given the assumptions that have been made, the probability that 
the project is authorized  α − − + + ) ( ) ( 5 . R T D C T g C g , where  R R T R W T g D h = − ′ Φ ) ( λ  and 
1 ) ( = Φ ′ D D C C g .   
(1) Given that the value of α  does not impact the type of lobbying employed by either 
interest group, the probability of the project being approved will decline with α .   
(2) Differentiation of  R R T R W T g D h = − ′ Φ ) ( λ  and second order conditions implies that  R T  
is rising with both λ  and h.  As  R T  rises, the probability that the project will be approved 
falls.   
(3) If   ) ( ~ ) ( x g x g C C C • = γ  then the probability of approval equals  
α γ − − + + ) ( ) ( ~ 5 . R T D C C T g C g  and the derivative of this with respect to  C γ  is 
C
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 which is positive since second order conditions have been assumed 
to hold, so the overall impact of  C γ  is positive.  If  ) ( ~ ) ( x g x g T T T • = γ  then the derivative 
of the probability of approval with respect to  T γ  equals 
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 which is positive since second order 
condition have been assumed, so the overall impact is negative.   
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, so lobbying by homeowners 
increases and lobbying by developers decreases.  Thus, the probability of approval must 
fall.   
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Table 1:  Real House Prices Over Time 
316 Metropolitan Areas;  $2000 
 1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 
Mean $59,575  $73,741  $80,556  $109,570  $120,929  $138,601 
% Change in 
Mean Over 
Decade 
-- 23.8%  9.2%  36.0%  10.4%  14.6% 
            
Real Single-Family Construction Costs Over Time 
One-Story, Modest Quality Home 
$2000/ft
2 
 1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 
Mean $49.70  $58.50  $63.60  $65.40  $63.30  $61.60 




17.7% 8.7%  2.8%  -3.2% -2.7% 
Notes:  
1. The source for the house price data is Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2004).  Prices are 
for single-family homes, with metropolitan area values being aggregated across their 
county components based on 1999 definitions from the Office of Management and 
Budget.  Prices are reported for individual primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA) 
components of consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs). 
 
2. Construction costs are from the R.S. Means Company, a consultant and data provider 
to the home building industry.  The underlying data include material costs, labor costs, 
and equipment costs for a lower-quality, one story house without a basement that still 
meets building code requirements in each market.  See the following two publications by 
the R. S. Means Company for greater detail on the underlying cost data:  Residential Cost 
Data, 19
th annual edition, (2000) and Square Foot Costs, 21
st annual edition (2000), both 
published by the R.S. Means Company. 
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Table 2:  Price-to-Construction Cost Ratios (P/CC) Over Time 
102 Metropolitan Areas 
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Mean  0.83 0.90 0.88 1.15 1.35 1.46 
Standard 
Deviation  0.16 0.16 0.16 0.30 0.59 0.55 
90
th  Percentile  1.04 1.10 1.12 1.49 2.17 1.85 
Maximum  1.19 1.30 1.31 2.17 3.49 4.06 
        
  Implied Land Share (~1 – CC/P) 
90
th  Percentile  0.04 0.09 0.11 0.33 0.54 0.46 
Maximum  0.16 0.23 0.24 0.54 0.71 0.75 
 
Notes:  Mean house prices are constructed for each metropolitan area using county-level 
data from the relevant decennial census.  Construction cost data are from the R.S. Means 
Company as described above.  Various adjustments to the price and cost data as 
described in the text.  28
 
Table 3:  New Housing Units as a Fraction of Initial Housing Stock 
  25
th percentile  Median  75
th percentile 
1960  .33 .40 .59 
1970  .24 .35 .45 
1980  .23 .36 .53 
1990  .11 .18 .26 
2000  .09 .14 .19 
Note.  New units in 1960, 1970 and 1980 are the number of housing units built since the previous census.  
New units in 1990 and 2000 are the total number of building permits.  Sample is limited to a balanced panel 
of 102 metropolitan areas for which it is possible to calculate housing prices relative to construction costs.   29
Table 4: 
Declines in Residential Construction Controlling for Density 































Year* P/CCt-10      
1970     -.36 
(.20) 
1980     -.51 
(.21) 
1990     -.70 
(.28) 
2000     -.83 
(.28) 













2  0.27 0.42  0.48 
Note.  Dependent variable is the number of new units in each decade relative to the initial housing stock.  
New units in 1960, 1970 and 1980 are the number of housing units built since the previous census.  New 
units in 1990 and 2000 are the total number of building permits.  Sample is limited to a balanced panel of 
102 metropolitan areas for which it is possible to calculate housing prices relative to construction costs.   
Density is the number of housing units per square mile.  Income is a weighted average of median family 
income by county, where the weights are the fraction of families in the metropolitan area.  Each right-hand 
side variable is expressed relative to its sample average.  Standard errors are clustered by metropolitan area. 
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Figure 1: Changes Across the House Price Distribution  31
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Figure 3:  Declining Construction Intensity in Select High House Value Markets 
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Figure 4:  Residential Construction and P/CC in the 1970s 
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Figure 5:  Residential Construction and P/CC in the 1990s 
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Figure 6:  The Intensity of New Single Family Construction and Density in the San Francisco PMSA 
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